The role of affect in social thinking and interpersonal behaviour

Summary and Conclusions

This paper argued that mild everyday affective states do have a significant influence on the way people perceive and interpret social behaviors, and the way they plan and execute strategic interactions. Different information processing strategies seem to play a key role in explaining these effects. Multi-process theories such as the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995a) offer a simple and parsimonious explanation of when, and how affect infusion into social behaviors occurs. Several experiments found that more extensive, substantive processing enhances mood congruity effects, consistent with the predictions of the AIM (Forgas, 1994; 1995b).

The paper also reviewed a number of empirical studies demonstrating how such principles can be translated into behavioral research, and how affective states impact on both simple, and complex interpersonal behaviors. These experiments show that affect can influence behavior monitoring and interpretation, as well as the actual performance of interpersonal behaviors, such as the formulation of, and responses to requests; the planning and execution of strategic negotiations; and the production of persuasive arguments. In contrast, affect infusion is reduced or absent whenever a social cognitive task could be performed using a simple, well-rehearsed direct access strategy, or a highly motivated strategy. In these conditions, there is little need, and little opportunity for incidentally primed mood-congruent information to infuse information processing (Fiedler, 2001; Forgas, 1995a).

Several of the field experiments also showed that affect infusion occurs not only in the laboratory, but also in many real-life situations. These findings have many applied implications. Affect is likely to have a significant influence on relationship behaviors, group behaviors, organizational decisions, consumer preferences, welfare policies and health psychology (Diener, 2000; Forgas & George, 2001; Salovey et al., 2001). Affect is also heavily implicated in many moral judgments and decisions (Haidt, 2002), another rapidly developing area of inquiry on the interface of affect and cognition. The tendency to alternate between substantive and motivated processing strategies, producing affect infusion and affect control respectively, could also be considered as part of an ongoing homeostatic strategy of self-regulatory mood management (Forgas, 2002).

A special case of affective influences occurs when people make judgments about their expected future affective reactions to anticipated outcomes. Such ‘future forecasting’ motivates many human endeavours in everyday life, yet there is now good evidence that people make many systematic mistakes when they forecast their future affective reactions (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). Exploration of the cognitive processes that underlie such affective forecasting errors is an exciting new research domain that is not yet adequately linked to research on contemporaneous emotion appraisals.

There can thus be little doubt that empirical research and theory building linking affect and cognition will continue apace in the future. In particular, evolutionary ideas are likely to become an important source of theoretical progress, focusing on the adaptive significance of affective phenomena, and highlighting the manifold links between cognitive research and the neurosciences (Buss, 2005). It is not too far-fetched to suggest that in early evolutionary history, wired-in emotional reactions provided distinct survival advantages (Frijda, 1986), just as our existing emotion appraisal strategies clearly serve adaptive ends (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Kirby, 2000). For example, positive affect also functions as a motivational resource, allowing people to cope with necessary but aversive situations (Trope et al., 2001). Acceptance or rejection by others appears to be a particularly potent cause of affective reactions (Leary, 2000), consistent with the probable evolutionary origins of many affective reactions. Evolutionary thinking might also help us answer the question: What are the cognitive functions of affective states? Is there an identifiable adaptive advantage we derive from experiencing affect? Much recent research suggests the beneficial consequences of positive affect in promoting creativity, flexibility, cooperation, integrative thinking, successful negotiation and a host of other desirable outcomes. However, we have also seen that in the right circumstances, negative affective states such as sadness may also confer significant adaptive advantages by promoting a more attentive, accommodating thinking style that produces superior outcomes.

It seems intriguing that despite our apparently never-ending quest for happiness, the human emotional repertoire remains heavily skewed towards negative emotions. Four of the six deeply ingrained basic emotions with distinct physiological substrates are negative ones – fear, anger, disgust and sadness - suggesting that these emotions were adaptive in the precarious ancestral environment, preparing the organism for flight, fight or avoidance in the face of challenges. It is interesting that even though sadness is clearly unpleasant and provides no hedonic benefit, it remains one of the most enduring and ubiquitous affective states (Ciarrochi, Forgas & Mayer, 2006). The possible adaptive functions and cognitive benefits of sadness are suggested in several recent experiments reviewed above, indicating that negative mood can reduce judgmental errors, improve eyewitness memory and produce more effective persuasive arguments. Such findings are broadly consistent with the notion that over evolutionary time, affective states functioned as automatic triggers to elicit cognitive and behavioural responses that are appropriate in a given situation.

It is noteworthy that most investigations of the cognitive and behavioral consequences of affect looked at mild, undifferentiated mood states, whereas research on the antecedents of emotion covers a wide variety of specific emotional states beyond positivity and negativity. We believe that an important direction for future research is to better integrate research on the elicitation of emotion with the study of the cognitive and behavioural consequences of affect. For example, several intriguing experiments now suggest that emotions also have reliable cognitive consequences for social judgments and decisions (Keltner, Ellsworth & Edwards, 1993).

In summary, this paper argued that different information processing strategies play a key role in explaining how affect influences social cognition and interpersonal behavior. The Affect Infusion Model in particular offers a parsimonious integrative account of the conditions likely to facilitate or inhibit affect infusion processes. Much of the evidence reviewed here suggests that affect infusion is most likely in conditions requiring constructive, substantive processing. Other processing strategies such as direct access or motivated processing result in the absence, or even reversal of affect infusion. Obviously a great deal more research is needed before we can fully understand the multiple influences that affect has on interpersonal behavior. Hopefully, this summary will help to stimulate further interest in this fascinating and important area of inquiry.

{rdaddphp file=moje_php/autorzy/jforgas_en.html}

References

• Adolphs, R. & Damasio, A. (2001). The interaction of affect and cognition: A neurobiological perspective. In: Forgas, J.P. (Ed.). The Handbook of Affect and Social Cognition. (pp. 27-49). Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum.


• Bless, H. & Fiedler, K. (2006). Mood and the regulation of information processing. In: J.P. Forgas Ed.). Affect in social cognition and behavior. New York: Psychology Press.


• Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148.


• Buss, D. M. (2005). The handbook of evolutionary psychology. John Wiley: Hoboken, NJ.


• Ciarrochi, J. V. Forgas, J. P. & Mayer, J. (Eds.). (2006). Emotional intelligence: A scientific approach. (2nd ed.) New York: Psychology Press.


• Clark, M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Towards understanding the relationship between feeling states and social behavior. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 73-108). New York: Elsevier-North Holland.


• Clore, G. L., & Byrne, D. (1974). The reinforcement affect model of attraction. In: T. L. Huston (Ed.), Foundations of interpersonal attraction (pp. 143-170). New York, NY: Academic Press.


• Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994). Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: The case for an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science. Cognition, 50, 41-77.


• Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ error. New York: Grosste/Putnam.


• Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: The science of happiness, and a proposal for a national index. American Psychologist, 55, 34-43.


• Eich, E. & Macauley, D. (2000). Fundamental factors in mood-dependent memory. In: J. P. Forgas (Ed.). Feeling and thinking: the role of affect in social cognition. (pp. 109-130). New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Feshbach, S., & Singer, R. D. (1957). The effects of fear arousal and suppression of fear upon social perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55, 283-288.


• Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective influences on social information processing. In: J.P. Forgas (Ed.). The handbook of affect and social cognition. (pp. 163-185). Mahwah: Erlbaum.


• Forgas, J.P. (1982) Episode cognition: internal representations of interaction routines. In: L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 59-104), New York: Academic Press.


• Forgas, J.P. (1985). Interpersonal behaviour: The psychology of social interaction. Oxford: Pergamon.


• Forgas, J.P. (1992). On bad mood and peculiar people: Affect and person typicality in impression formation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 863-875.


• Forgas, J.P. (1993). On making sense of odd couples: Mood effects on the perception of mismatched relationships. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 59-71.


• Forgas, J.P. (1994). Sad and guilty? Affective influences on the explanation of conflict episodes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 56-68.


• Forgas, J. P. (1995a). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 39-66.


• Forgas, J. P. (1995b). Strange couples: Mood effects on judgments and memory about prototypical and atypical targets. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 747-765.


• Forgas, J.P. (1998a). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiation strategies and outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 565-577.


• Forgas, J.P. (1998b). Asking nicely? Mood effects on responding to more or less polite requests. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 24, 173-185.


• Forgas, J.P. (1998c). Happy and mistaken? Mood effects on the fundamental attribution error. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 318-331.


• Forgas, J. P. (1999a). On feeling good and being rude: Affective influences on language use and request formulations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 928-939


• Forgas, J. P. (1999b). Feeling and speaking: Mood effects on verbal communication strategies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 850-863.


• Forgas, J.P. (2002). Feeling and doing: affective influences on interpersonal behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 1-28.


• Forgas, J.P. (Ed.). (2006). Affect in social thinking and behavior. New York: Psychology Press.


• Forgas, J.P. (in press). When sad is better than happy: The beneficial effects of mild dysphoria for cognition and social influence strategies. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.


• Forgas, J. P., Bower, G. H., & Krantz, S. (1984). The influence of mood on perceptions of social interactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 497-513.


• Forgas, J. P., Bower, G. H., & Moylan, S. J. (1990). Praise or Blame? Affective influences on attributions for achievement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 809-818.


• Forgas, J.P. & George, J.M. (2001). Affective Influences on Judgments and Behavior in Organizations: An Information Processing Perspective. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86, 3-34.


• Forgas, J.P. & Gunawardena, A. (2001). Affective influences on spontaneous interpersonal behaviors. Unpublished manuscript, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.


• Forgas, J.P. Vargas, P. & Laham, S. (2005). Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 574-588.


• Frijda, N. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


• Gilbert, D.T. & Wilson, T.D. (2000). Miswanting: some problems in the forecasting of future affective states. In: Forgas, J.P. (Ed.) Feeling and thinking: the role of affect in social cognition. (pp. 178-200). New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Haidt, J. (2002). “Dialogue between my head and my heart”: Affective influences on moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 54-56.


• Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.


• Hilgard, E. R. (1980). The trilogy of mind: Cognition, affection, and conation. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 16, 107-117.


• Koestler, A. (1978). Janus: A summing up. London: Hutchinson.


• Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press


• Leary, M. R. (2000). Affect, cognition, and the social emotions. In J.P. Forgas (Ed). Feeling and thinking: the role of affect in social cognition. (pp. 331-356). New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Neisser, U. (1982). Memory: What are the important questions? In: U. Neisser (Ed.) Memory Observed. San Francisco: Freeman.


• Niedenthal, P. & Halberstadt, J. (2000). Grounding categories in emotional response. In: J. P. Forgas (Ed.). Feeling and thinking: the role of affect in social cognition. (pp. 357-386). New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Pascal, B. (1966/1643). Pensees. Baltimore: Penguin books.


• Pervin, L.A. (1976). A free-response description approach to the analysis of person-situation interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 465-474.


• Salovey, P. Detweiler, J.B. Steward, W.T. & Bedell, B.T. (2001). Affect and health-relevant cognition. In J. Forgas (Ed.), Handbook of Affect and Social Cognition. (pp. 344-370). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.


• Schachter, S. & Singer, J.E. (1962). Cognitive and social psychological determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69, 379-399.


• Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective states. In E. T. Higgins & R. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 527-561). New York: Guilford Press.


• Schwarz, N. & Clore, G.L. (1983). Mood, misattribution and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523.


• Sedikides,C. (1995). Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: Tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(4), 759-777.


• Smith, C. A. & Kirby, L. D. (2000). Consequences require antecedents: Toward a process model of emotion elicitation. In J. Forgas (Ed.). Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 83-106). New York: Cambridge University Press.


• Trope, Y. Ferguson, M. & Raghunanthan, R. (2001). Mood as a Resource in Processing Self-Relevant Information. In: J.P. Forgas (Ed.). The handbook of affect and social cognition. (pp. 256-274). Mahwah: Erlbaum.


• Watson, J.B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1-14.


• Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 35, 151-175.

Bądź na bieżąco! Zapisz się na nasz newsletter! (dodatkowo otrzymasz eBooka "Iluzje codzienności")

e-mail: